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Chapter 9  
 
‘Harem Women Seem the Happiest to Me’: Novel 
Women, Fictions of Domesticity and National 




After more than fifty years of self-rule, the old certitudes of Indian politics have 
crumbled. It is now recognised that democracy in India was not a bequest from the 
British; rather it was established after a profound historical rupture. Sunil Khilnani, 
writing in The Idea of India, claims that Indians were able to imagine new possibilities 
of being a nation because there were insufficient resources in their own past to construct 
their future (Khilnani 1997: 17-30). While the nationalist leadership established 
independent India on the basis of colonial institutions, the socialist leanings of the first 
Prime Minister of independent India, Jawaharlal Nehru, critically influenced the 
country’s economic and political directions during and after the Cold War. The 
‘Bandung Regimes’ such as India under Nehru (1947-1964), Egypt under Nasser (1954-
1970), Indonesia under Sukarno (1945/49-1965), and Ghana under Nkrumah (1957-
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1966) attempted to direct national development in their countries between the capitalism 
of the First World and the communism of the Soviet Bloc. Nehru’s tenure in office is 
crucial because, during this time, the state stabilised and became a developmental 
agency which aspired to penetrate all areas of the society’s life, and showed that it could 
be subject to democratic procedures (Khilnani 1997: 17-30). 
 
Many scholars have analysed the importance of the national development model in the 
period after the Second World War. Arturo Escobar, in a specific response to Jürgen 
Habermas’s call for the completion of the, as yet, ‘unfinished project’ of modernity, 
claims that the post-1945 development project is ‘the last and failed attempt to complete 
the Enlightenment in Asia, Africa and Latin America’ (Escobar 1995: 3-4, 9-12, 21-22, 
221, 224).2  Ozay Mehmet, like Escobar, also argues that ‘central’ to ‘westernsation is 
the idea of economic development as ‘progress’ determined according to the market 
forces of supply and demand which emerged in the West’ (Mehmet 1995: 2). The irony 
is that though the nation-state was grounded in western European history, after the 
Second World War, it also became the vehicle by which the power of ‘western’ 
industrialised countries was challenged. Mark Berger amongst others has pointed out the 
contradiction in the fact that the new nation-states rose in the overall context of 
colonialism even as nationalism emerged in the colonies as a reaction against 
colonialism, and Eurocentrism (Berger 2001). In this context, Akhil Gupta makes the 
point that the possibility of the new nations of Asia, Africa, or the Middle East 
transcending their Eurocentric foundations is more limited than has often been thought. 
Gupta emphasises that with decolonisation the ‘underdevelopment’ that the state-guided 
national development projects were supposed to address was not simply a ‘structural 
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location in the global community of nations’, but also an important ‘form of identity in 
the postcolonial world’. Gupta sees the new forms of ‘global governmentality’ 
(embodied by a growing array of international accords, treaties, and institutions) as 
creating a shift that means that the notion of the ‘postcolonial’ is a ‘more appropriate 
modifier to forms of identity, states of being, and modes of analysis than ever before’ 
(Gupta 1998: 9, 11, 14; 22-4, 39-42; 338-9)). 
In these debates about modernisation and appropriate methods of development, India 
provides a useful example of the interaction of the colonial legacy and the Cold War. It 
also occupies a key position in relation to the idea of national development because of 
its size, its democratic credentials and its support for non-alignment. After 
decolonisation, there were high expectations, both in India and outside, that the new 
government could serve as a model for developing nations by delivering material 
prosperity to its citizens. In the 1950s, the vision of development articulated by the 
Indian government, led by Nehru and the Congress Party (the organisational successor 
to the Indian National Congress), was not only socialist and nationalist but also 
technocratic and paternalistic. Sunil Khilnani (1997), for example, points out that Nehru 
believed that only a national state, centrally responsible for directing economic 
development, could safeguard India’s future progress and independence. Concurrently, 
this state also had to build a constitutional, non-religious regime, extend social 
opportunities and maintain sovereignty in the international arena. Nehru was convinced 
by the history of the west that an independent India could simultaneously industrialise, 
maintain constitutional democracy and direct economic and social redistribution. In 
some ways, says Khilnani, this project was closer to post-war European social 
democracy than Soviet practice. Nehru proposed a view of the state’s domestic 
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responsibilities that had parallels with Keynesian ideas in that the state had actively to 
create conditions for economic expansion by investment in and direction of a public 
sector that would function alongside private enterprise in a mixed economy, acting as a 
counterweight to the cyclical swings and fashions of private investment (Khilnani 1997: 
76-77).  
By the mid-1960s, however, it became clear that the beneficiaries from national 
development were the private commercial and industrial groups and bureaucratic and 
professional elites directly or indirectly connected to the political leadership rather than 
the majority of the population (Kohli 1987: 61). Under the stewardship of Nehru’s 
successor, Lal Bahadur Shastri, the overall approach to national development altered 
significantly. Private investment in industry was encouraged, as were incentives rather 
than controls in development planning. There were also massive public investments in 
capital-intensive rural projects, such as the ‘Green Revolution’ in Punjab. By the time of 
Shastri’s death in January 1966, the key elements of Nehru’s conception of national 
development (an emphasis on public sector, heavy industries and land reform and the 
cooperative reorganisation of agriculture), had been almost completely marginalised 
(Frankel 1978: 246-247). 
 
Nehru’s daughter, Indira Gandhi, whose populist politics further altered the program of 
national development from the Nehruvian vision to the idea of India as a modernising, 
but basically agricultural nation, succeeded Shastri. Gandhi was however unable to 
maintain her populist developmentalism and by the mid-1970s, there was a growing 
gulf between her socialist rhetoric and increasing levels of inequality and immiseration, 
particularly in rural areas. The failure of Mrs Gandhi’s party to deliver to rural areas is 
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demonstrated by the parliamentary success of communist parties and several important 
communist-led rural insurgencies in the 1960s and early 1970s (Sen Gupta 1972). 
However, the failure of Mrs Gandhi’s version of the national development project was 
directly connected to the increasingly capital-intensive character of farming which 
broke down the ‘semi-feudal ties’ that had often connected rich peasants to their poor 
and landless agricultural workers. This, along with an increasingly unequal distribution 
of wealth, exacerbated social tensions in the countryside. In the 1980s, successive 
governments, under Mrs Gandhi (from 1979) and her son Rajiv Gandhi (from 1984) had 
dismantled many of the platforms of state-guided national development in India (Berger 
2001).  
 
Khilnani has argued that the Indian state was virtually unique among new states in 
setting itself huge developmental targets to be achieved by democratic means. For most 
of the fifty odd years since independence, the electoral dominance of the Congress Party 
and the availability of a sophisticated and extensive public bureaucracy gave the Indian 
economy a remarkable continuity of direction. Unlike China, India did not eschew 
democracy to make a revolutionary leap into industrialisation nor did its leadership and 
intelligentsia intentionally veer to the market as China’s post-Mao leadership did. In 
fact, in 1991, when the end of the Cold War increased the pressure on India’s still 
highly regulated national economy, the Indian state was pushed towards liberalsation 
and market-oriented economic reform by expatriate intellectuals and economists 
employed by international economic agencies and universities. Economists such as 
Jagdish Bhagwati held that India’s economy had failed because of ‘disappointing 
productivity performance’ and a distrust of the market, combined with faith in central 
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control. This nurtured misconceived economic policies, which continued to keep the 
concentration of economic power out of private hands. The liberalisers argued that India 
had to create conditions for growth, since this was necessary for the alleviation of 
poverty. But still centrally at issue in the debate about economic reform was the idea of 
India and the kind of society liberalisation would create (Khilnani 1997: chapter 2). The 
1980s saw the rise of Hindu nationalism in India and the eventual (albeit unstable) 
formation of a government by the anti-secular nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) 
by the late 1990s. While the dynamics of this shift are complicated, the growth of Hindu 
nationalism is a reaction, in part, to the failure of the state-guided national development 
project of the post-1947 era (Corbridge and Harris 2000: 143-172, 192-199; Vanaik 
1997; Hansen: 1999). 
 
According to Nivedita Menon, colonial policies in India resulted in a comparatively 
weak and unstable bourgeoisie who, nevertheless, still exercise a leadership function in 
India in coalition with rich farmers, the bureaucracy and the urban professional middle 
classes (Menon 1999: 12). However, as Sudipta Kaviraj points out, for a thoroughgoing 
bourgeois revolution to be effected and for industrialisation to take place, a domestic 
market must be built up by reducing poverty in the countryside. Since land reforms have 
been largely ineffective because of the influence of the landed interests in the coalition 
of ruling classes, the entire planning process has been an exercise in trying to promote 
industrialisation without radical agricultural transformation (Kaviraj 1988). Menon 
comments that the theory behind the first three decades of planning was that 
redistribution of incomes and property was necessary to create a market for goods and 
services. Since 1980, however, the rationale has been that development can be achieved 
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even in a limited market, if purchasing power is enhanced for a small elite in services, 
trade and manufacturing. This can be done by raising their emoluments, giving them tax 
exemptions and reductions and using public money to provide loans and subsidised 
interest rates in order to create a market for luxury goods. However, the incentives for 
the private sector and the slashing of government expenditure, which necessarily follow 
liberalisation/structural adjustments, adversely affect the poor, especially women and 
children (Menon 1999: 12). The conflict between rhetoric of liberalisation, the reality of 
immiseration and the discourses of national development have opened up a space which 
the forces of Hindu fundamentalism have found easy to occupy. The fictions discussed 
in the rest of this essay describe some of these processes.  
 
‘Women are the creators of the nation’: women and nationalism 
 
In this trajectory of ideas, from redistributive developmental practices to liberalisation, 
where do women stand in the imaginary of the nation? In her introduction to the book 
Feminist Nationalism, Lois West presents the dilemma of women and nationalism by 
asking: ‘How could women be nationalists when they did not have equal rights? How 
could women not be nationalists when they loved their country, people and home?’ 
(West 1997: xii). She points out that women are constituted as citizens differently from 
men: for example, in access to paternal property rights (Hindu women in India) or equal 
rights under the constitution (in the USA) to name only two. Nira Yuval-Davis and 
Floya Anthias identify women as active transmitters and producers of national culture. 
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They point out that nationalism was constituted from the very beginning as a gendered 
discourse (Yuval-Davis and Anthias 1989: 7). In Sylvia Walby’s words, the literature on 
women and nation ‘has engaged but little with the differential integration of women and 
men into the national project’ (Walby 1992: 81).  
According to Geraldine Heng, national liberation movements are also inadvertently the 
record of a triumphant nationalism that makes its gains at the expense of women. 
Nationalist movements made common cause with women’s issues because nationalism 
requires a certain self-representational vocabulary – a definitional apparatus to imagine 
and describe itself (Heng 1997: 31). Anne McClintock, remarking on the ‘Janus-faced’ 
quality of the nation first noted by Tom Nairn, describes the nation’s simultaneous and 
paradoxical adherence to a primeval past and its turn to the future. This ‘temporal 
anomaly within nationalism’ brings together in a mutually uncomfortable but necessary 
alliance the elements of nostalgia and social and cultural atavism with the notions of 
modernity and ‘progress.’ The incommensurability of these two sets of terms is resolved 
by ‘figuring the contradiction as a ‘natural’ division of gender.’ Women are the 
‘atavistic and authentic “body” of national traditions’; they signifying nationalism’s link 
to a deep past, its conservative principle. Men, on the other hand, stand for the 
modernity of nationalism which is dynamic, aggressive and revolutionary Women, 
along with other traditionally marginalised groups, function as ‘the living archive of the 
national archaic’ (McClintock 1997: 137).  
 
Partha Chatterjee, in writing about the social construction of Indian nationalism 
historically, has demonstrated how patriarchal nationalism was disseminated through 
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colonialism and how struggles over views of nationalism are inherently gendered 
(Chatterjee 1993: 9). Even where anticolonial nationalism was defined as oppositional 
to western colonialism, women were limited to the contexts of the family, although the 
centrality of family relations was reinterpreted and emphasised. The discourse over 
nationalism in India situated ‘the women’s question’ in an inner domain of sovereignty, 
far removed from the arena of political contest with the colonial state (Chatterjee 1993: 
117). Particular social practices degrading to Indian women were used by colonialists as 
examples of the ‘unworthiness’ of Indian customs and traditions, which necessitated 
embracing the ‘modernisation’ of colonialism. Indian (male) nationalists reacted to this 
by situating women in the spiritual realm of the home, which was superior to the 
material realm of the world being constructed and represented by colonial interests.  
 
Chatterjee’s account is relevant to modern India, because the construction of 
nationalism is still very much a gendered dynamic in the arena of the family. This is an 
extract from an article published in a popular annual three years after India’s 
independence. It was titled ‘Santan Janani-Jatir Janani’ (‘The Mothers of Children are 
the Mothers of the Nation’): 
Women are the creators of the nation. The community is created by 
human beings but each of these humans was once nurtured in the lap 
of a mother, hence who else can be the maker of the nation than 
women? This is certain that human resources are more valuable than 
wealth and the creator has left the development of this human wealth 
in the hands of women. 
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The writer continues by quoting from Swami Vivekananda: 
The ideal of an Indian woman is that marvellous selflessness of 
motherhood, the all-enduring, all forgiving mother...In Hindu 
thought being a mother is the ultimate aim of every woman. 
She concludes with the English proverb ‘The hand that rocks the cradle rules the world’ 
in proof of her thesis (Devi 1950: 157).  
In his recent work, Provincializing Europe, Dipesh Chakrabarty provides a 
‘supplementary explanation’ of the valorisation of the nineteenth century Bengali terms 
grihalakshmi, ‘the housewife imagined in the divine model of Lakshmi, the goddess of 
domestic well-being’ and griha, the home. He proposes that Bengali modernity may 
have imagined life-worlds in ways that never aimed to replicate either the political or 
the domestic ideals of modern European thought (Chakrabarty 2000: 217). 
Chakrabarty concludes that Bengali nationalist thought on new domesticity and 
women’s education in the nineteenth century combined the bourgeois distinction of 
public and private, of domestic and national, with the idea of the male lineage and that 
this constituted a crucial difference between the ideology of Bengali modernity and 
some of the critical assumptions of patriarchal liberalism in Europe (Chakrabarty 
2000: 228). Nations, therefore, are frequently figured through the iconography of 
familial and domestic space. In postcolonial India, the cultural and gendered politics of 
Indian nationalism can be read through the texts of popular novels, where constructions 
of the ‘modern’ women in the service of the developmental state are presented for the 
consumption of the literate middle class. I have confined my discussion largely to the 
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fiction published in Bengali after 1947 by one overwhelmingly successful author, 
Shankar.  
 
‘Progressive/modern/intellectual’: the rhetoric of modernity 
 
Shankar is a phenomenon in the Bengali publishing industry: his novels found a 
resonance in the Bengali psyche that sat paradoxically with the then overt left political 
ambience of Bengali society. This resonance has been maintained in the profoundly 
altered social and political world that obtains in the educated middle-class Bengali 
world of the 1990s. His work created new directions in the Bengali novel by 
demonstrating the ways in which the rhetoric of development, modernsation and 
individualism permeated the discourses of Bengali society in this period. A readership 
survey in Eastern India in 1981 and later in 1992 found that readers of Shankar’s novels 
scored the highest in all categories of income and age distribution for weekly 
magazines. Women constituted by far the largest proportion of consumers of these 
novels and Shankar was nominated by 82% of those surveyed as their favourite writer.3 
A clear stereotype also emerged from this survey about readers’ perceptions of 
themselves. They were overwhelmingly Hindu and categorised themselves as married, 
middle-class, cheerful, cine-goers, fairly to highly educated, traditional and ‘staying at 
home’. They defined their preferences as intellectually oriented, for example towards 
comparatively highbrow and political films and intellectual, rather than popular novels. 
The analysis commented: 
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These readers seem to be ‘progressive/modern/intellectual’ in 
outlook though not in their lifestyle. Perhaps this image is dear to 
them.4 
 
Shankar’s popularity reaches outside Bengal as well. His work has been translated into 
most of the major Indian languages and the renowned director Satyajit Ray has filmed 
two of his novels.  
 
The family, according to Anne McClintock, offers national narratives an indispensable 
metaphoric figure for sanctioning national hierarchy within a putative organic unity of 
interests (McClintock 1997: 91). In Shankar’s work, these ‘natural’ hierarchies are 
strengthened; the nurturing female and the work-oriented male usually represent normal 
relationships of family life. The therapeutic functions of these novels lie in their 
reconstruction of the average citizen as centrally important in the context of the 
institutions of modern life which otherwise appear insurmountable. Social criticism is 
often confined to gestures, so that there is no urgent need to dismantle established 
hierarchies or radically subvert the status quo. In the traditional symbolism of this kind 
of fiction, the two ends of the political spectrum move towards each other, so that the 
radical is tamed and the conservative liberalised. This fiction performs a crucial social 
function in that it manages collective social unease by embedding it into comfortably 
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familiar stereotypes. The burden of social problems is evaded by a radical simplification 
of the complex into manageable symbolic units. 
 
The society depicted in this fiction is primarily nationalist, Hindu and middle-class. A 
favourite backdrop is the Indian corporate world of the 1960s, ‘70s and ‘80s, harnessed 
in the cause of the development of the nation but notorious for its tolerance, indeed 
encouragement of institutionalised corruption. This licence ‘raj’ was established by 
Nehruvian policies of development. In this regime, licences to establish factories, 
produce goods or run commercial farms were sold by a huge, inefficient and corrupt 
government bureaucracy which openly courted bribes and ‘gifts’. There is also a 
generational conflict present in this fiction, presaging an apprehension of living in the 
young nation. Young lower middle-class men, especially, engender a deep uneasiness: 
they represent the uncontrollable potency of masculine energy the desires of which are 
thwarted by the new polity. In a famous novel which was also turned into a film by 
Satyajit Ray, a father (Dvaipayan) muses uneasily about his unemployed son whom he 
feels is ‘out of tune’: 
 
Nowadays young men were a worry. Who knew what thoughts entered their heads 
in secret or what they might do if they got involved in politics or out of anger 
against society [...] Dvaipayan had heard that nowadays many unemployed young 
men behaved like hooligans. They took all the advantages of living at home yet 
constantly threw tantrums. They did not wash their own clothes or even pour 
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themselves a glass of water, share in any of the work of the house or abide by any 
of the rules of the family. They had turned their homes into jungles 
(Shankar 1981b: 51)  
 
In these texts, the old order is ritually challenged by tomorrow’s headlines and the 
discourses of modernity before being re-valorised. Part of the success of Shankar’s 
writing appears to be that it creates the illusion of questioning by purporting to 
challenge convention and the established order, while tensions in social or gender 
matters merely validate location and class. They reassure the reader that the novel is not 
ignoring social issues or important matters, but the consequence usually is to reduce 
such matters to local colour and authentication. Complex social and economic 
technicalities are converted to comfortably primitive formulations of human 
motivations.  
 
‘The best watch in Switzerland’: technology, commodity and 
desire 
 
The predominant language of the texts is that of upward mobility, which the citizens of 
the new nation consider a most desirable attribute. Women are guardians of a system of 
values produced by the acquisition of appropriate commodities. Sections of these novels 
resemble self-help manuals which give the predominantly female readers a glimpse of 
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high society etiquette and mores. Thus if the boss comes to dinner, the hostess must 
dress particularly carefully because her appearance and clothing signify her place in the 
social and company hierarchy. She must not look too dressed-up, or too casual; she 
must also give the impression that she has personally supervised the dinner 
preparations. Her make-up must be toned down and the sari should have the simplicity 
of expensive haute couture. 
 
[…] the sari should be simple but the guests must realize that the price 
of the sari is not simple at all. The impression I want to create is that I 
was in the kitchen all the time, and only came out and freshened up 
when the guests arrived. After all, does a hostess have time to think of 
her own appearance when she is preparing to receive guests? 
(Shankar 1981b: 63)  
 
In this new era, the middle classes understand that they are not judged by their intrinsic 
moral worth, but by their possessions and these private relationships cover a profound 
recognition and acceptance of the public verdict. Their social position is relative and 
lacks legitimacy, because their acquired situation can never have this intrinsic value. It 
is this thwarted legitimacy (in relation to cultural, political and professional life) which 
makes the middle class invest in the private universe, in private property and the 
accumulation of objects with a dedication that masks the fact that true social recognition 
has escaped them (Bowlby 1985 and Baudrillard 1981). Thus, it is the wife of a senior 
officer in a foreign-owned company who insists that he should take a flask to office, as 
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befits his position. She demonstrates to her husband the office hierarchies even in such a 
seemingly simple action as drinking water: 
 
Shyamalendu examined the situation carefully and realised that one’s 
position in the office could be deduced from one’s arrangements for 
drinking water. He did not know how the people in the lowest 
positions – i.e. the bearers drank water. In all these years of service 
he had never actually seen a bearer drink water. He had heard that a 
glass or two were hidden behind the filing cabinets and used by 
whoever required them. Then the clerks. Each of them had on their 
tables a glass with a number in red on the bottom. […] The glasses 
of the senior clerks were larger than those of the junior clerks. Then 
came the local [… or] Indian assistants. Their glasses were not so 
large but fine and etched with beautiful flowers and accompanied by 
two colourful enamelled lids. Above them were the junior officers. 
They had red containers on their tables for their glasses and had to 
remove the concave lid to drink water. The covers used by the senior 
officers had fine needlepoint on them. But for the managers, office 
water was completely unpalatable. They had to have flasks. And the 
directors had two flasks. One contained cold water and only God 
knew what was in the other. 
(Shankar 1981c: 12-13) 
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The constitution of the upwardly mobile self as social subject depends on the 
acquisition of appropriate objects to project the desired image via the nuances of codes 
in dress and possessions. These consumer citizens are, according to Baudrillard, not so 
much possessors of, as possessed by commodities; they put on their identities at the 
same time as their clothes (Baudrillard 1981). Their possessions must have pedigrees 
that guarantee them as successful citizens of the new nation. Thus, scenes and characters 
in these novels are constantly described in terms of objects and are brand saturated: 
 
‘Take it, you won’t get this cigarette here,’ Poppy Bishowas said 
softly, ‘ can’t stand anything but imported. I’d rather not smoke for a 
day or two than smoke those Indian weeds [...] I’m worried about my 
stock of cigarettes. I only have one carton of Dunhill International in 
stock and how long will that last? A pilot from a foreign airline 
regularly brings me these as gifts but he hasn’t turned up for some 
time. Other customers sometimes bring cigarettes as gifts but they 
are either Rothman’s or Benson and Hedges. I hate those brands.’ 
(Shankar 1990: 281; 310-311)  
 
The upwardly mobile bourgeois family is obsessed not merely by possession, but by the 
need to underline what it possesses two or three times. In another novel, the apartment 
of the protagonist is described in loving and intricate detail by his wife. We learn that 
the covered area is 2780 square feet, that there are two bedrooms, a guest room, a study, 
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a dining room, a kitchen, a pantry, a covered verandah and a boxroom; that there is a 
parking space outside as well as the servants’ quarters (120 square feet), that the electric 
wiring is concealed, and that the master bedroom has ‘his’ and ‘her’ bathrooms with 
genuine bathtubs. The woman enumerates the internal features of the apartment, with 
tangential references to the company directors’ perks, as if she were a real estate agent: 
the wall-to-wall carpet with its Dunlop underlay is from Mirzapur (the directors of the 
company, however, get genuine Persian Bokhara carpet), her husband can replace his 
curtains only once a year (the directors may change them at any time), only one 
bedroom is air-conditioned (the directors have air-conditioning in the entire house). It is 
irrelevant in this context that, in the climate of Calcutta, wall-to-wall carpeting is 
downright uncomfortable, nor is it relaxing to lie in a warm bath. The bourgeois taste 
imported from the west is conceived of as superior; the wife complains that the colour 
of the ‘piano’ switches do not match the ‘plastic emulsion’ paint on the walls and have 
to be changed (Shankar 1990: 33-34). 
 
The novels also show a fascination with new technology and gadgetry which is 
intrinsically linked to the trope of development. Alien configurations are digested and 
reduced to familiarity for the easier consumption of the readers. The value of time, the 
novel idea of counting calories: these buzz-words of modernity are thus domesticated 
and put into circulation. For example, Shankar might describe his protagonist’s watch 
over forty pages, in close, almost loving, detail: 
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The quartz watch on my left hand reads thirty-five minutes, twelve 
seconds past eleven. Time is most valuable in business and industry 
so I use the best watch in the world, so that not even one second is 
wasted. With the best watch in Switzerland buckled to my wrist, I 
am ready to profitably use every minute of every day, but the sisters 
and brothers of my motherland insist on making every person in this 
country indifferent to time [...] My watch has many ways to keep 
time under control – one of them is an alarm. Once it is set, this 
companion will alert me every five minutes [...] When I wanted to 
sleep in this morning, this foreign watch started to make its beeping 
sound [...] My quartz watch is a special computer. It can tell me 
when I have consumed my extra calories by exercise [...] The quartz 
watch on my wrist is reminding me that it is time for my medicine. 
All the various chores of my day are programmed into my watch – 
this mechanical wife reminds me dutifully of them […] I am late in 
taking my tablet and look at my watch. It has honey in its breast and 
is as shy as a Bengali bride. It won’t talk but after exactly five 
minutes it will call me softly without annoying anyone else. I’ve 
swallowed the tablet with some cold water and informed my life’s 
companion. It won’t annoy me any more. 
(Shankar 1983a: 7-40 passim) 
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Here the watch replaces the faithless wife in the novel and fulfils the traditional role of 
pious and submissive woman. It is more real than most of the other characters in the 
novel and points to the ideological uneasiness that permeates this sort of fiction.  
 
‘The average of Laksmi, Sarasvati and Annapurna’: the 
transaction of education 
 
Shankar’s overt views on the subject of women are those of a liberal middle-class 
Bengali man influenced by the ideals of Gandhi and the Indian National Congress. On 
the one hand, he acknowledges the very real oppression faced by most women: 
 
If we cannot bring women into the forefront of our society and give 
them their due responsibility and a major part to play in the 
community, this country will never progress. In my opinion we are 
moving backwards because women are regressing.5 
 
On the other hand, however, Shankar, like most men of his class and generation, and 
indeed like the male protagonists of his novels, finds it hard to conceive of autonomous 
women. Paradoxically, he ascribes to women much of the blame for their current 
situation. They have not been able to fulfil the spiritual roles demanded of them in the 
new nation because they possess all the ‘backward’ traits of the nation: slavery, self-
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hatred, lack of self-confidence; they choose financial security over principle and 
mistake superficial things such as western clothing or proficiency in English with true 
emancipation. Liberation is impossible until women stop oppressing each other: 
 
Men are definitely primarily responsible for the condition of women 
but women must bear part of the responsibility too. It is a fact of 
history in all civilised countries that those who fall behind are always 
partly responsible for their state; indeed their oppressed condition is 
one of the prime symptoms of their regression.6  
Shankar reiterates these themes in many of his novels: 
Women are the worst enemies of other unfortunate women [...] They 
are most pleased when other women are in trouble... [My father went 
to jail …] because my future mother-in-law put pressure on him for 
more money [...] She was not willing to compromise even 
infinitesimally on cash, ornaments or other parts of the dowry. 
(Shankar 1990: 235) 
 
The new nation does not have enough legitimacy to stop these practices by moral 
exhortation; men (and women) have to be convinced of the utility of such measures.   
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It is difficult to convince people to give away or to sacrifice 
something [dowry] but they may listen if you say that a sacrifice 
today will lead to a gain tomorrow.7 
 
Expectations of women are clear in Shankar’s novels. A woman’s interests are 
congruent with those of her husband and children. In serving them, she serves herself. 
Emancipated and educated (hence westernised) women, especially, must maintain this 
role and representation of themselves to be sympathetic to the reading public. They may 
go out to work, but their prime responsibility is to their home and family and they must 
cut their domestic coat according to their husband’s cloth. If a woman acts outside these 
norms by infidelity or lack of domesticity or piety, she cannot be redeemed unless she 
repents and recuperates her previous roles.  
 
In the 1950s and ‘60s, middle-class women responded to the increasing demands on 
them by reconstituting and supporting one another through social networks formed from 
their families and local communities. But with the increasing break-up of the joint 
family structure, the greater job mobility of both men and women, the rising cost of 
living and the almost insoluble problems of transport and pollution in Calcutta, these 
communities have become more difficult to maintain. The contemporary readers of this 
literature, be they housewife or wage-earner, are increasingly isolated. It is probable that 
this act of reading constitutes a collective fantasy where the right behaviour and well 
played role invariably leads to happiness, and straying from the clearly defined 
representation of womanhood spells disaster. These women are telling themselves the 
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story of a nation whose central vision is one of surrender to the dominant pre-
independence ideology, where women and the feminine anchored the nationalist 
imaginary. Passivity is at the heart of this experience, in the sense that submissiveness 
to the female ideal produces the balance, harmony and order which are the final goals of 
each narrative. For example, Abhik Roy, writing in 1998, describes how domesticity 
was the dominant ideological theme in television commercials in the 1990s, where the 
Indian woman is shown as a subservient home-bound wife, happily engaged in domestic 
chores, whose role is ‘crowned’ by the advertised product (Roy 1998: 117-134). The act 
of reading allows readers to experience the sense of having been reconstituted 
affectively, if only vicariously. 
 
In this process, reading becomes a transaction. ‘Reading for instruction’ is a primary 
justification in a society where modernisation and development have made information 
a highly valued commodity. Most of the female readers are mothers whose children 
must pass examinations and attend interviews from the ages of four or five to get 
admission to elite ‘English-medium’ or ‘convent’ schools, to ensure them a fighting 
chance of entering the highly coveted professions of medicine, engineering, computing 
or management. They must not only do extremely well in their school-leaving 
examinations, but also pass difficult competitive tests. Even poorly paid government 
clerical jobs require English language and general knowledge tests, the latter of which 
often resemble trivial pursuit games rather than relevant exercises of intelligence. 
Mothers are usually the after-school tutors of their children; it is not uncommon for 
children as young as six or seven to require four or five hours of study every evening, to 
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complete their homework and keep up with their studies. The privileging of English-
language education and the economic imperative for educated unemployed people to 
find jobs has created a situation where it is mandatory for the middle-class Bengali, 
traditionally employed in the service sector of the economy, to have a university degree, 
speak fluent English and possess encyclopaedic general knowledge. The latter qualities 
represent the capital and passport required for entry into the realm of success depicted in 
these fictions, the world of plum jobs in foreign companies, banks or the civil service. 
From these books, women ‘learn’ English words and expressions which indicate 
westernised sophistication as well as historical facts and social and economic data 
mainly about Europe and America. Shankar is renowned for his ‘research’ and his 
novels contain many informative anecdotes, for example how Henry VIII invented the 
menu and the conduct of whimsical hotel guests in regard to bath water or matching 
bedlinen (Shankar 1983b: 30-40). It is not surprising, therefore, that the main response 
to the question ‘Why do you read these novels?’ was Pore anek kichu jana jay, i.e. ‘One 
can learn a lot of things by reading (these books)’ (Mukhopadhyay 1981: 2).  
 
Reading is thus transformed into an activity where an exchange takes place, where 
something is acquired. This defines this activity retroactively in developmental terms as 
goal-directed work. Hence, it replicates the current Bengali middle-class belief that 
education is closely connected with success and status. In this context, Shankar is part 
of a long tradition. Dipesh Chakrabarty has described how education in nineteenth-
century Bengal was considered part of a woman’s charm, beauty and pleasantness, 
while lack of education (as well as too much of it) was supposed to render women 
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quarrelsome (Chakrabarty 2000: 225). Also, in postcolonial India, a desirable woman 
is one who can function fluently in English, in the public sphere, but in the domestic 
world, must retain the values of submissiveness, piety and domesticity that are the hall-
marks of the ideal Bengali woman. From the 1950s onwards, stories by many popular 
writers presented ideal women as highly educated as well as perfect housewives. For 
example, one such woman is described by a popular writer of the period as not only 
having a university degree but ‘also a diploma in interior decoration […] She’s a 
graduate, good-looking, she’s certain to get a salary of two hundred and fifty (rupees).’ 
(Nandi 1950: 142-143) 
 
In these stories, the desirable male protagonist is equally stereotyped. He is modern, 
personable, tall and either in the possession of a good job or family money. The 
desirable groom Khagen in Parasuram’s story ‘Ratantikumar’ is 
 
personable, well-dressed, obviously wealthy, drives his own car. He 
was twenty-five or twenty-six years old and working in his father’s 
silver and coal mines. A groom of such beauty, accomplishments, 
education and money was rare. 
(Parasuram 1952: 20) 
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The perfect woman for such a groom has to be a composite of physical, mental and 
domestic virtues. She must be self-effacing and submissive, an efficient manager of the 
household, a good mother, educated and accomplished. In the same story, the 
requirements for such a woman are spelt out in the description of Jayanti. Not only is 
she an expert cook, but she is beautiful enough not to need make-up and modest to boot: 
 
[Jayanti] has passed her M.A. examination [… She] is going to get a 
job soon. If you calculate an average of Laksmi, Sarasvati and 
Annapurna, you would get [Jayanti]. 
(Parasuram 1952: 23) 
 
Chakrabarty points out that, in the nineteenth century, Laksmi came to stand for all that 
was beauteous, harmonious and feminine in the Bengali home (Chakrabarty 2000: 
227). Ironically, this is still the perfect woman in the new nation: the average of Laksmi, 
the goddess of wealth, beauty and domestic gifts; Sarasvati, the goddess of music and 
learning; and Annapurna, the goddess of plenty. Both Jayanti and Khagen bring their 
own capital to this marital bargain. He has all the important attributes of the public 
sphere, connections and money. She has the essential requirements of the private and 
domestic sphere, beauty and accomplishment. There is an interesting parallel here with 
the goddess of the women’s wing of the fundamentalist Hindu organisation, the 
Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). Their goddess, Ashtabhuja, is a composite of 
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Sarasvati and Lakhsmi but Annapurna has been replaced by Mahakali, denoting female 
power and protection (Bacchetta 1999).  
 
It is important that women subscribe to this psychology of security, otherwise the basis 
for their sexual and social contract will disappear. If a husband cannot provide these 
objects of security, then the duty and devotion of the wife is enjoined by tradition and 
religion regardless of the man’s character, ability or conduct. In a story by another 
writer, Anuradha, who has been ‘guilty’ of a pre-marital relationship, redeems herself 
by becoming a superwoman, caring for a bedridden husband, holding down three jobs 
as well as keeping the domestic fires burning. Her husband says: 
 
‘[She is] an ideal wife […] Four years I haven’t earned a cent and the 
whole burden is on her.’ [...] Anuradha said, ‘What’s so difficult 
about all this? The job is from ten to five. I teach a girl sewing for 
one hour in the morning and teach music for two hours in the 
evening.’ 
(Chaudhuri 1950: 133) 
 
Women have to resort to nurturance to keep men emotionally in their unique place and 
also to reify and replicate their own journey to female identity as constructed within the 
patriarchal culture of the nation. This literature ratifies the inevitability of the 
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institutional structure which defines women’s needs as identical to those of their 
husband’s and family’s and sees fulfilment in their satisfaction. For female readers, this 
literature is therefore a ‘kind of sentimental education’, a ‘culture’s ethos when spelt out 
in a collective text’ (Geertz1973: 449).  
 
‘Harem women seem happiest to me’: the necessity of success 
 
Shankar’s fiction expresses immense disdain for weak or unwaged men; wives of such 
men, compelled into the male role of bread-winner, are either overtly independent, 
promiscuous and disrespectful of their husbands; or models of the suffering, patient and 
ever-dutiful wife. This, too, continues the national tropes of the bread-winning man and 
the domestic woman. Stories by other writers also echo this theme. A woman who 
cannot marry because her mother and two younger brothers depend on her earnings, 
says bitterly: 
 
Harem women seem happiest to me [...] What I really want is for a 
man to hold me always, to look after me, and fulfil my every need 
and desire so that I never have to leave the harem and go outside. 
(Nandi 1950: 142-143)  
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A woman who is more successful than her husband or boyfriend dooms the relationship 
to failure, because their worldly success displaces the man from the centre of the world. 
This dilemma is explored in one of Shankar’s most successful novels, Jana Aranya:  
 
Tapati was renowned as a good scholar while Somnath was just 
ordinary. Tapati obtained good marks while Somnath just managed 
not to fail. Tapati could write and speak beautiful English. Somnath 
couldn’t cope with English at all […] After this Somnath could not 
keep pace with his girl-friend […] Tapati put a first-class M.A. 
degree into her vanity bag with great ease. Somnath tried and failed 
to get dozens of jobs in two and a half years but Tapati Ray was a 
research scholar. Somnath’s dream of becoming a poet had withered 
a long time ago. His employment exchange number was 210017. 
(Shankar 1981b: 101) 
 
The theme of male fear of failure and poverty promotes individuation and actualisation 
of self through acquisition not of inherited wealth or status, but the new and 
individualistic accoutrements of modernity. In these writings, the men hunger for 
specifically economic success, not through the old methods of government service but 
in the overtly masculine and modern arena of business. The aggressive nature of this 
world is thoroughly masked under the female characters’ extreme economic innocence. 
Economically passive, the female protagonist lacks options other than marriage or 
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motherhood. Women who buck the system pay with interest for the dissonance they 
create. In these novels, both by Shankar and other writers, the sine qua non of happiness 
is the material success of the male protagonist. These are basic attributes of his 
masculinity, without which he cannot control the females in his life. Other stories in the 
period just after independence reiterate these themes. A man of lower status cannot trust 
his wife to love him for himself alone:  
 
I have neither education nor intelligence, nor the ability to earn 
money, no virtues at all. How can I tie you to me? That is why I am 
scared all the time. 
(Mitra 1952: 207) 
 
Women must therefore guard themselves against romantic appeal, or ‘affect’ if there is 
no ‘interest’, i.e. economic stability. Happiness is assured if interest and affect meet in a 
male character. But if those two qualities are distributed between different men, then 
tragedy is the inevitable consequence (Bowlby 1985). 
 
Much of the success of Shankar’s novels is based on the complicity of his readers in 
accepting unquestioningly the view of themselves presented in his works. Women, who 
are the main consumers of these novels, appear as consumers within the novels and also 
as objects of consumption, who co-operate whole-heartedly in the process. They are the 
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ones who painstakingly guard their husbands’ status and throw themselves 
wholeheartedly into consuming the code: whether enumerating the hierarchy of drinking 
water or justifying their choice of sari. If a woman is willing to forego status, the man 
himself repudiates her because he knows that this is what she should want. In Jana 
Aranya, Tapati wants to marry Somnath, but he refuses: 
 
Tapati asked, ‘Then I don’t have any rights? I can’t decide who I 
love? Can’t women love other things about men except jobs?’ 
Somnath answered in a quiet yet sad voice, ‘If I take what you are 
offering then no one will forgive me, Tapati. People will think that 
this unemployed layabout knowingly spoilt the life of an educated, 
beautiful and innocent girl [...] A man who has neither a job nor any 
earnings is not considered human in this society […] a man is 
responsible for supporting his wife – this has been a tradition for 
thousands of years.’ 
(Shankar 1981b: 103; 123-124) 
 
This dichotomy in the portrayal of women is emblematic of their paradoxical position in 
society as commodities and consumers in one.  
 
In the modern Indian nation, sexual inequality is an inescapable fact of Indian life and 
traditional gender roles, values and expectations still predominate. However, despite the 
strength of social norms relating to women’s roles, within the middle-class that is the 
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subject of Shankar’s work, there have been seminal changes in attitudes since 
independence. Women have entered areas of social life traditionally dominated by men 
such as higher education, the work force and politics. Urban women’s groups have been 
active since the 1970s in raising the consciousness of women and demarcating their 
oppression as a major social problem (for example, by the movement against dowry). 
The ferment over the debate on traditional gender issues is then a theme which should 
manifest itself in popular literature, especially where authors assert themselves as 
concerned by injustice or oppression. Shankar seems conscious of this, quoting an 
extract from an ancient Hindu text in the epigraph of Bittabasana: ‘There is nothing 
unachievable for a woman in the three worlds – they can create fire from water 
and water out of fire’ (Shankar 1983a: 7). 
 
In spite of these proclamations, Shankar’s novels reflect and reinforce traditional social 
and gender norms, while alternatives are presented as non-existent or negative. The 
family and husband still form the central focus of a woman’s life. Higher education and 
work experience are seen as appropriate insofar as they increase her eligibility for 
marriage. Women personify the feminine qualities of the nation, inert, backward-
looking and traditional. In the new regime, they sometimes hamper idealistic men from 
their regimen of duties which have ramifications far removed from the domestic sphere. 
This masculine work is always of national importance, i.e. essential in building the 
nation (Shankar 1981a and 1966).  
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‘She did not want this sort of liberation’: the ambiguity of 
liberation 
 
When liberated women appear in these fictions, they have ‘westernised’ themselves to 
the point that they have repudiated their spiritual and inward role in the development of 
the nation. The typical corporate wife’s passion in life is the advancement of her 
husband’s career and in presenting the right impression to the world. She is described as 
taking snuff, smoking and calling her husband by his first name. ‘Actually’, says 
Shankar, ‘their culture is totally different. It has been imported from England and 
America, but has come here without being unpacked.’ (Shankar 1981c: 87) This is the 
mukhara or shrew that Chakrabarty describes, the woman who is Alaksmi, the antithesis 
of Laksmi (Chakrabarty 2000: 226-7). 
 
However, the role that the wife of a commercial executive in the corporate world is 
expected to play is different from traditional expectations only in the details: 
 
In many offices before someone is hired in a high post, the wife of 
the applicant is interviewed as well […] We too should receive a 
salary. The company puts its tired and irritable executives in our 
hands in the evening after working them to death all day and 
wringing all the juice out of them. We have to rejuvenate them for 
work the next day. We do this for the company.  
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(Shankar 1981c: 110) 
 
A central theme running through the novels is that the roles of wife and mother are 
completely satisfying in themselves and leave little room for the achievement of other 
personal goals. Liberated women characters created by Shankar seldom work out of 
interest or a sense of vocation. Career women are usually depicted as caricatures: they 
need supervision and encouragement from charismatic, inspirational and selfless male 
superiors. Where attempts are made to offer options other than marriage to women, the 
logic of both language and theme implies that such women cannot be emancipated or 
fulfilled in current Indian society. This is an acceptable description of (western) 
women’s liberation from a career woman, who has experienced sexual harassment at 
work: 
 
Women’s liberation was a dirty word in the West. This class of 
whimsical women refused to take their husbands’ names after 
marriage or be called Miss or Mrs, they wore no make-up or even 
brassieres – all in the name of freedom. [She] definitely did not want 
this sort of freedom. 
(Shankar 1983c: 103)  
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Ironically, for such women, the solution is to go overseas, where they can be 
truly liberated:  
 
If I become the wife of a teacher, then I shall starve. It’s better to 
stand on one’s own feet and escape abroad. As a woman, my slogan 
is ‘Liberty, equality, fraternity’. 
(Shankar 1981c: 117) 
 
Shankar’s liberated heroines have to ‘go west’ to be truly emancipated.8 Another key 
word in this statement of emancipation is ‘wife’; all women know that marriage is 
inevitable, indeed desirable. Regardless of career success, women are not fulfilled until 
they are married: ‘There is no reason not to marry just because one is an [civil 
service] officer.’ (Shankar 1981c: 117)  
 
Even valid criticisms of traditional gender roles are subverted because they are usually 
articulated by excessively modern and aggressive women, for example an unmarried, 
cigarette-smoking, motor-bicycle riding teacher: 
 
Physics, chemistry, history, economics, whatever you teach Bengali 
women, they will eventually spend their lives in the mess of the 
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kitchen, only interested in laundry detergent, baby food, and talcum 
powder. When I see my ex-students, it doesn’t seem at all credible to 
me that I ever taught them anthropology. 
(Shankar 1983d: 24)  
 
Since women are accorded the role of guardians of moral values, it is easy in this 
context to accede to the notion that the nation has lost its moral bearings. In an article on 
Hindu nationalism, Amrita Basu quotes from a 1991 speech by Sadhvi Rithambara, a 
female Hindu nationalist: 
 
Things have deteriorated to the point that everything is now bought 
and sold, minds, bodies, religion, and even the honor of our elders, 
sisters, mothers and sons […] We cannot auction our nation’s honor 
in the market of party politics. 
(Basu 1999: 113) 
 
Paola Bacchetta has described how ideas, commodities and lifestyle models from other 
regions and beyond India’s borders cause the members of the RSS’s women’s 
organisation to ‘adjust’ their notions of the gender binary and gender complementarity 
to allow for new forms of agency (Bacchetta 1999). But the pronouncements of the 
leaders of this and similar organsations echo the sentiments expressed in Shankar’s 
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novels. In 1991, the president of the national women’s organisation of the ruling 
Bharatiya Janata Party said:  
 
For Indian women, liberation means liberation from atrocities. It doesn’t mean 
that women should be relieved of their duties as wives and mothers. Women 
should stop demanding their rights all the time and think instead in terms of their 
responsibilities to the family. 
Another office-bearer of the same organisation added: ‘We want to encourage our 
members not to think in terms of individual rights but in terms of responsibility to the 
nation.’ (Basu 1999: 117)  
 
The parable of the modern nation reaches its culmination in the portrayal of the heroine 
of Bittabasana (‘A Lust for Wealth’), Shankar’s most complex novel in this period. 
Shakuntala is estranged from her first husband, Banabehari, because he cannot afford to 
send his terminally sick son overseas for treatment. Masculinity is identified with the 
ability to access expensive western technologies: 
 
You are a good-for-nothing […] those who can’t make a living are 
eunuchs […] It’s not enough to have physical capabilities – those 
who can’t arrange their children’s medical treatment should not be 
greedy for fatherhood. 
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(Shankar 1983a: 80-92) 
 
Banabehari becomes obsessed with acquiring wealth and orchestrates his wife’s 
relationship with a rich businessman, who gives him the capital to establish his own 
business. Shakuntala’s decision to leave Banabehari, her first husband, which might be 
seen as an act of independence, actually requires his active connivance. Later, when her 
second husband dies, Banabehari says: 
Shakuntala – my wife – is a widow. You might say the term is 
wrong, it should be ex-wife or previous wife. But mark this: once a 
wife, always a wife in spite of all the legalities of the land. 
(Shankar 1983a: 132) 
Shakuntala becomes a successful entrepreneur by re-enacting the conventional gender 
roles within the public arena. For example, she rejuvenates her ailing company by 
cleaning its offices and decorating it with flowers (Shankar 1983a: 141). She wears the 
white clothes mandatory for Bengali widows at corporate meetings and functions and 
observes the appropriate rituals including vegetarianism (Shankar 1983a: 149; 171; 
185).  And finally, when her company is in danger of a takeover, her first husband acts 





If economic liberalisation had delivered, a large proportion of the post-independence 
Indian population could have availed themselves of the opportunities to make money 
and enjoy the fruits of consumer capitalism. However, while capitalism has made 
inroads into the economy and undermined traditional social relationships and social and 
economic controls, the transition has been partial, slow and incomplete. In this intensely 
competitive environment, the retreat of the old secular ideologies and the Nehruvian 
vision of development have enabled the proponents of both economic liberalisation and 
Hindu fundamentalism.  
 
In the world of writers like Shankar, the path of Nehruvian development is a double 
sign. It represents the corruption of the licence raj as well as the desirable lifestyle and 
possessions of the educated elites. The more the nation modernises, the more corrupt 
and desirable it becomes. All the noble social goals of the Nehru era, education, 
women’s emancipation, progress become transactional – things to be exchanged for 
wealth, western technology and status. There is no room for integrity here; integrity is 
possible either in the past or in the west. This topography indicates however the space 
where right-wing ideologies can flourish; the tropes of the future represented by market 
liberalisation to assist the new world of commodity, technology and desire coupled with 
the tropes of the past in the retrieval of traditional ideas of femininity.  
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These fictions tell the story of the ‘deferral’ of western modernity in the imaginary of 
the postcolonial nation. This flawed representation of the modern nation also embodies 
its tragedy. The narrative of the Nehruvian model of development imagines a nation 
whose progressive trajectory is mired in corruption and uncertainty. It cannot keep its 
promise to its citizens to provide them with either the necessities of life or the desired 
symbols of modernity. With the breakdown of the old values that provided safety nets 
for the less able, entry into this new world and access to its lifestyle is possible only 
through corruption and betrayal. The arena of politics and culture where creative 
autonomy and change is possible is left for other chroniclers, another kind of fiction. 
Authors, such as Kabita Singha and Mahasvetha Devi, whose writing is now known in 
the English-speaking world outside India through the work of critics such as Gayatri 
Spivak, have created women who are autonomous beings with agency even in the most 
profoundly oppressive systems. These women can in fact create fire out of water.  
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